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Abstract 
This Professional Interest Brief seeks to provide a clear guide to interpreting data generated 
by Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). The interpretation of IRAP data is not 
immediately intuitive and yet has received little explicit attention in the published literature. 
As such, it is hoped that this guide will help clarify this matter, particularly for those new to 
using the IRAP or intending to use the measure in the future. In doing so, we hope to make 
the measure more accessible and facilitate continued use of the methodology and its 
contribution to the contemporary Relational Frame Theory (RFT) literature. 
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Interpreting and inverting with less cursing: A guide to interpreting IRAP data 
 
One of the cornerstones of Contextual Behavioral Science (CBS: Hayes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Wilson, 2012) is its appeal to a basic account of human language and cognition 
through Relational Frame Theory (RFT). Relational Frame Theory argues that the 
fundamental building block of human cognitive abilities, such as abstract reasoning and 
generative language is “arbitrarily applicable relational responding” (AARR: see Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). Much early RFT research revolved around demonstrating 
its proposed analytic units, relational frames, that were established in the laboratory (see 
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, in press, for review). However, in recent years, RFT researchers 
have attempted to extend RFT’s conceptual account by also assessing histories of relational 
responding that were established outside of the laboratory (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Hussey, in press), such as by posing questions about the probability or “strength” 
of individuals’ relational responding in applied domains such as OCD, depression, or 
professional burnout (see Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012a; Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 
2012; Kelly & Barnes-Holmes, 2013, respectively). In order to do this, RFT researchers have 
built on methodologies frequently used in cognitive and social psychology to assess what are 
referred to as “implicit attitudes” (see De Houwer & Moors, 2010; see also Hughes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Vahey, 2012). This has produced a procedure that has shown utility in assessing 
the relative strength of relational responding: the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
(IRAP: Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010). IRAP research now 
represents one of the forefronts of RFT research (Barnes-Holmes et al., in press). 
Task structure 
A brief description of the procedure will now be provided, as the interpretation of 
IRAP data is best understood through an understanding of the structure of the task itself. The 
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IRAP involves presenting pairs of stimuli to participants on a computer screen. Participants 
respond to blocks of these stimulus pairings, and are required to respond as accurately and 
quickly as possible according to what we will describe as two responding rules. In some 
IRAP studies, specific instructions regarding these rules are provided before each block (e.g., 
“Respond as if I am positive and others are negative”). However, in other studies, specific 
instructions to respond according to a particular rule for each block are not provided (e.g., 
“Try to get as many correct as possible – go fast, making a few errors is ok”). For the 
purposes of communication, however, we will describe the task in terms of utilizing two 
specific types of rule. In short, the IRAP compares, under accuracy and latency pressure, the 
relative ease (i.e., speed) with which participants respond according to one rule relative to the 
other. In other words, the IRAP is a procedure that is used to assess subtle reaction time 
biases that are often referred to as reflecting “implicit attitudes” (De Houwer & Moors, 
2010). 
 
Table 1.  
Example rules and stimuli for an IRAP investigating self-esteem 
Rule A 
Respond as if I am good and others are bad 
Rule B 
Respond as if I am bad and others are good 
Label 1: “Self” 
I am 
I’m 
I think I am 
Label 2: “Others” 
Other people are 
Others are often 
Other people can be 
Target 1: “Positive” 
Loyal 
Trustworthy 
Kind 
Moral 
Generous 
Friendly 
Target 2: “Negative” 
Manipulative 
Dishonest 
Cruel 
Horrible 
Selfish 
Heartless 
Response Option 1 
True 
Response Option 2 
False 
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For illustrative purposes, consider the stimulus set for the hypothetical self-esteem 
IRAP outlined in Table 1 (see Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010, for 
an alternative published version of a self-esteem IRAP). One of the two responding rules, 
Rule A (e.g., “Respond as if I am good and others are bad”) or Rule B (e.g., “Respond as if I 
am bad and others are good”), is presented to participants before each block of trials .We will 
refer to these as Rule A blocks and Rule B blocks. Table 1 also lists what are arbitrarily 
referred to as label stimuli (presented at the top of the screen), target stimuli (presented in the 
middle of the screen) and response options (presented at the bottom of the screen). Label 
stimuli frequently contain what can loosely be referred to as categories (e.g., self vs. others), 
whereas target stimuli frequently contain attributes (e.g., positive vs. negative). These four 
classes of stimuli each contain one or more exemplars of the relevant category and attribute 
(e.g., loyal, trustworthy, kind, etc.). However, when describing the data researchers typically 
refer only to the overarching functional class (e.g., positive or self). Finally, participants 
respond using one of the two response options, which are typically mapped to the “D” and 
“K” keys. 
Each IRAP trial presents one label stimulus and one target stimulus and both response 
options. The combination of two label categories (e.g., self and others) and two target 
categories (e.g., positive and negative) produce four possible “trial-types” (e.g., trial-type 1 = 
self-positive, trial-type 2 = self-negative, trial-type 3 = others-positive, and trial-type 4 = 
others-negative). It is important to note that the trial-types are procedurally separated, insofar 
as label 1 stimuli are never presented within the same trial as label 2 stimuli, and target 1 
stimuli are never presented within the same trial as target 2 stimuli.  
The required correct and incorrect response options for each trial-type in each of the 
two rule blocks are pre-determined by the task structure itself (Table 2; see Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010). To illustrate, let us return to the hypothetical self-esteem IRAP. 
INTERPRETING IRAP DATA 
6 
Rule A block employs contingencies that require participants to respond as if “I am good and 
others are bad”. For example, a self-positive trial (i.e., trial-type 1) might present the 
participant with the stimuli “I am” and “loyal” and the response options “True” and “False”. 
In this case, True would be the correct response, by definition, while selecting False would 
present the participant with a red X. However, if these same stimuli appeared on a Rule B 
block trial, the correct response would now be False. The IRAP is arranged in this way in 
order to assess the difference in reaction times between Rule A and Rule B blocks for each 
trial-type (e.g., the difference in speed between responding True on Rule A blocks vs. False 
on Rule B blocks). Furthermore, participants are presented with pairs of Rule A and Rule B 
blocks, each of which contains a large number of IRAP trials in order to capture a sufficient 
number of reaction times to conduct a meaningful analysis (e.g., 48). Typically, participants 
complete pairs of practice blocks until they meet both accuracy and latency mastery criteria, 
followed by three test block pairs (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010). Given 
that the IRAP effect is produced via accuracy and latency pressure, these criteria should be 
set as high as is feasible. Recent studies have frequently employed accuracy≥ 80% and 
median time to first correct response ≤ 2000 ms, but future work may of course tighten these 
criteria further. It should be noted that both mastery criteria must be met within both blocks 
in a block pair for the criteria to have been met. On balance, variations on these criteria have 
not been systematically explored, and future efforts might revise these practices.  
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Table 2.  
Required responses on each trial-type within a hypothetical self-esteem IRAP 
 Trial-type 1:  
Self-positive 
Trial-type 2: 
Self-negative 
Trial-type 3: 
Others-positive 
Trial-type 4: 
Others-negative 
Rule A block 
(‘Respond as if I 
am good and others 
are bad’) 
True False False True 
Rule B block 
(‘Respond as if I 
am bad and others 
are good’) 
False True True False 
 
 
Interpretation of IRAP effects 
Methods of quantifying effects on the IRAP 
To reiterate, the IRAP presents stimuli to participants in pairs of blocks. The same 
categories of stimuli are presented in both blocks. However, the critical difference between 
the two blocks is that the required response option for each trial-type alternates between 
them. For example, on one block, participants must respond to a given stimulus pair (e.g., “I 
am” and “Loyal”) with one response option (e.g., “True”), whereas on the other block, 
participants must respond with the other response option (e.g., “False”). The IRAP researcher 
then seeks to quantify the difference in responding speed between the two blocks in any pair. 
Loosely, this difference indicates which responding direction makes more intuitive sense or is 
more “automatic” for an individual (De Houwer & Moors, 2012).  
While this difference can be quantified in numerous ways, specific common practices 
have emerged from the broader literature on the analysis of reaction-time data (see Ratcliff, 
1993; Whelan, 2008). In particular, due to the distribution of reaction times, some form of 
normalization technique is recommended when quantifying the differences between block 
pairs. The most common way to quantify the difference between responding on two paired 
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blocks is to treat the difference as an effect, and thus to estimate the size of this effect using 
an adaptation of Cohen's d (Cohen, 1977) known as a D score (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, et al., 2010; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). In short, the D score involves 
removing all latencies above 10,000 ms, and then calculating the difference between the 
mean reaction time to first correct response on each of the two blocks divided by the standard 
deviation of all the reaction times in both blocks (see Table 3). D scores have a theoretical 
range of -2 to +2. The generic concept of the D score has been applied to the IRAP’s specific 
structure (i.e., by calculating scores for each trial-type rather than for the overall block). 
These are often referred to as “DIRAP scores” when applied to the IRAP, but will be referred to 
here as D scores for simplicity (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010). 
It should be noted that the D scores produced by several implementations of the IRAP 
(e.g., the IRAP 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 programs: Barnes-Holmes, 2014) are calculated 
based on time from stimulus onset to first correct response. Although other versions of the D 
score do exist (see Greenwald et al., 2003), no published work has systematically explored 
the relative utility of different scoring algorithms within the context of the IRAP. 
Nonetheless, this version of the D score appears to be performing well, given that it was 
employed in the overwhelming majority of studies included in a recent meta analysis of 
clinically relevant IRAPs (Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). 
It is critical to note, however, that although the D score is included in several 
implementations of the IRAP, it is an analytic method and not an essential part of the 
procedure itself. Indeed, not all studies have employed it (e.g., Kishita, Takashi, Ohtsuki, & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2014), and many other strategies could be used to quantify the difference in 
reaction times depending on a researcher’s goals. For example, G scores are a non-parametric 
alternative that convert reaction times into fractional ranks (Nosek, Bar-Anan, Sriram, Axt, & 
Greenwald, 2014). 
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For the purposes of clarity, and to encourage the consideration of a wider variety of 
scoring procedures, the specific steps involved in calculating both D scores and G scores are 
included in Table 3. This table also includes the details of two ways in which data has been 
excluded when participants fail to maintain criteria within the test blocks (i.e., removing data 
from particular blocks vs. excluding all of it, see Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012b; 
(Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010). We have included this 
information here because, on reflection, previous papers have not always been clear about 
which steps are performed automatically by several implementations of the procedure and 
which must be performed manually by the researcher.  
Due to the D score’s popularity, the remainder of this article will discuss the 
interpretation of IRAP effects using this metric alone. Nonetheless, the following points are 
likely also to be applicable to other metrics. Whichever strategy is employed, researchers 
should ensure that their analysis takes into account the distribution of reaction times (Ratcliff, 
1993; Whelan, 2008). For example, contrary to very early recommendations, simply 
calculating difference scores and using an arbitrary cut off value to create groups is not 
appropriate (e.g., Milne, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2005). It is important to 
note, however, that normalization techniques, such as the D score, normalize data within an 
individual’s data and not across individuals. As such, they remain compatible with single-
subject design approaches.
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Interpreting trial-types 
Let us assume that we have collected data from a number of participants using the 
self-esteem IRAP using a typical setup (e.g., completing practice blocks until mastery criteria 
are met followed by three pairs of test blocks; see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 
2010). After averaging each participant’s D scores across the three test block pairs, we are 
left with four D scores, one for each trial-type. Let us assume that the average of these D 
scores across participants is as follows: self-positive, D = 0.41; self-negative, D = 0.29; 
others-positive, D = -0.33; and others-negative, D = -0.14. These notional D scores and their 
standard errors are graphed in Figure 1, upper panel (“Self-esteem IRAP”). We will now 
discuss how these effects should be interpreted. As discussed above, the absolute magnitude 
of the D score provides a metric of the size of the difference in reaction times between Rule 
A and Rule B blocks. However, due to the IRAP’s multiple trial-types, interpreting the results 
is less intuitive than within other procedures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT: 
Greenwald et al., 2003). The following paragraphs therefore aim to clarify and simplify the 
interpretation of D scores.  
On any given trial-type, a D score greater than zero indicates that participants 
responded more quickly during Rule A blocks than Rule B blocks. Conversely, a D score less 
than zero suggests the reverse (responding more quickly on Rule B blocks than Rule A 
blocks). Table 3 provides interpretations of potential D scores on the hypothetical self-esteem 
IRAP.  As a memory aid, we often speak about the IRAP’s output as following a “true-false-
false-true” format. That is, assuming the IRAP uses “True” and “False” as response options, 
D scores greater than zero on each trial-type represent faster responding for True, False, 
False, and True, respectively. This rule of thumb may help to remind the researcher whether 
D scores greater than zero on each trial-type represent the assertion or rejection of the 
proposition contained within the trial-type – for example, whether responding on trial-type 1 
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(self-positive) was biased towards responding with “True” (which could be interpreted as an 
“I am positive” effect) or “False” (which could be interpreted as an “I am not positive” 
effect).  
 
 
Figure 1. Self-esteem IRAP D scores by trial-type. Upper panel: D scores as output by the 
IRAP program. Lower panel: IRAP D scores with trial-types 3 and 4 inverted for clarity of 
interpretation. 
 
 
INTERPRETING IRAP DATA 
14 
Some published research has also calculated “overall” D scores by averaging the four 
trial-types (e.g., Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012; Remue, De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, 
Vanderhasselt, & De Raedt, 2013). Interpretations of such overall D scores must therefore be 
based on all four categories contained within the IRAP. For example, within our self-esteem 
IRAP, an overall D score greater than zero would represent a “self-positive/others-negative” 
effect (i.e., on the whole, participants evaluated self as being positive or not-negative to the 
degree that they evaluated others as negative or not-positive). In contrast, an overall D score 
less than zero would represent a “self-negative/others-positive” effect (i.e., on the whole, 
participants evaluated self as being negative or not-positive to the degree that they evaluated 
others as positive or not-negative). Overall D scores are therefore comparable to the 
interpretation of IAT D scores, in that they provide a single overall bias score (Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). It should be noted, however, a primary reason for employing an 
IRAP over other procedures, such as the IAT, is its ability to parse out an overall effect into 
four individual bias scores (i.e., one for each trial-type). We therefore encourage researchers 
to make use of trial-type-level analyses wherever feasible. 
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When interpreting individual trial-types, it is important to ensure that the 
interpretation only ever refers to the classes of label, target, and response options that were 
presented in that trial-type, and not other classes. For example, the D scores greater than zero 
on trial-type 2 in the self-esteem IRAP should be interpreted as “I am not negative”. While it 
may be tempting to collapse this double negative into a more commonsense “I am positive” 
interpretation, this must not be done because trial-type 2 only presents participants with 
negative attributes. Effects on this trial-type are therefore a specific rejection of “self-
negative”. This does not necessarily equate to an assertion of “self-positive”. While this may 
initially seem pedantic, the ability to unpack subtle effects such as this is a key rationale for 
using the IRAP in the first place. With this in mind, researchers must be careful that their 
interpretations map onto what participants actually respond to on-screen.  
Closely related to this point is the issue of using negations in a stimulus set (e.g., not 
me, not good, etc.). To be specific, we strongly suggest that researchers avoid the use of 
negations in their stimulus sets. Such IRAPs can, of course, generate useful results (e.g., 
Remue et al., 2013), but participants often report finding such IRAPs difficult to complete.  
Imagine, for example, our hypothetical self-esteem IRAP used “I am not” as Label 2 rather 
than “Others are”; and that a D score less than zero was obtained on trial-type 3 (i.e., “I am 
not-positive”). In effect, participants have shown a bias towards responding with a double 
negative (i.e., “I am not-positive-False”), which of course is quite “cognitively” demanding 
when responding at speed. Of course, the issue of how stimuli should be selected, more 
generally, is a broader one that requires separate discussion in its own right. For the purposes 
of the current brief, it is suffice to say that researchers should be cognizant of the demands 
particular trial-types (and stimuli more generally) place on participants when designing 
stimulus sets. 
Trial-type inversions 
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Many types of analyses require careful understanding not just of the interpretation of 
individual trial-types, but also of how they are interpreted in relation to one another. For 
example, we might ask whether participants implicitly evaluate self and others as equally 
positive. If a paired t-test were conducted on our hypothetical D scores produced by the 
IRAP, it would reveal a significant difference between trial-types 1 (self-positive) and 3 
(others-positive; see Figure 1, upper panel). One might, therefore, erroneously conclude that 
there is a significant difference between the “I am positive” and “others are positive” effects 
in our hypothetical results. However, this is not the case, because we have not compared like 
with like: scores greater than zero on the self-positive trial-type represent a bias toward 
confirming positive attributes, whereas scores greater than zero on the others-positive trial-
type represent a bias towards refuting positive attributes. In other words, scores in the same 
direction (greater than zero) reflect positive bias for self, but a negative bias for others. As 
such, D scores greater than zero on the vertical axis in Figure 1 (upper panel) are not united 
by a common interpretation, such as representing a bias towards confirming (rather than 
rejecting) positive attributes. 
In order to appropriately conduct an analysis that involves the comparison of, or 
interaction between, IRAP trial-types, one must therefore first invert half of the IRAP trial-
types (i.e., multiply by -1) so that D scores greater than zero on the trial-types of interest 
share a common interpretation – for example, representing a bias towards confirming (rather 
than rejecting) positive attributes. Doing so will also allow for intuitive interpretation of 
IRAP data, due to a common vertical axis. Which trial-types ought to be inverted depends on 
the IRAP stimulus set and analytic question, as will be discussed below. Although this 
manipulation is commonly performed within published articles, its details are often limited to 
a single line in the results section (e.g., Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). This has proven to 
be somewhat opaque to researchers who are not familiar with the procedure.  
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In order to explain this manipulation, let us take a step back to consider the 
relationship between stimulus categories in the IRAP. Specifically, research with the IRAP 
has typically employed label and target categories that are opposite from one another along a 
meaningful dimension. For example, “self” and “others” (labels) as opposed to “self” and 
“bananas”, or “positive” and “negative” (targets) as opposed to “positive” and “tasty”. Which 
trial-types are to be inverted depends, however, on the specific nature of the relationship 
between label and target stimuli (e.g., self and positive). In general, the reversals are 
conducted such that D scores above zero represent biases towards positivity for both labels 1 
and 2. Thus, in the self-esteem IRAP example, inverting trial-types 3 and 4 yields a 
meaningful vertical axis across all four trial-types (see Table 4). That is, D scores above zero 
for self and for others represent positive or not-negative effects.  
 
Table 5.  
Interpretation of D scores on the self-esteem IRAP when the 3rd and 4th trial-types are 
inverted. 
  Trial-type 1:  
Self-positive 
Trial-type 2: 
Self-negative 
Trial-type 3: 
Others-positive 
Trial-type 4: 
Others-negative 
D score > 0 
 (‘positive’ or ‘not-
negative’ effects) 
I am positive I am not negative Others are  positive 
Others are not 
negative 
D scores < 0 
 (‘negative’ or ‘not-
positive’ effects) 
I am not positive I am negative Others are not positive Others are negative 
 
 
If we apply this trial-type inversion to our hypothetical data, trial-types 3 and 4 
change from -0.33 to 0.33, and -0.14 to 0.14, respectively (see Figure 1, lower panel). Now, 
scores greater than zero represent positive or not-negative effects (see Table 4). A paired t-
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test would now, correctly, show no differences between effects on the self-positive and 
others-positive trial-types, and we would conclude that participants implicitly evaluate self 
and others as being equally positive. Furthermore, the results of the IRAP across all four trial-
types are now readily interpretable from the plotted data, and can be summarized as effects 
that indicate that “I am positive” (D = 0.41); “I am not negative” (D = 0.29); “others are 
positive” (D = 0.33); and “others are not negative” (D = 0.14). We should also note at this 
point that we are in the habit of speaking about IRAP data that has been inverted in this 
manner as following a “true-false-true-false” format, because D scores greater than zero now 
represent faster responding for True, False, True, and False on each trial-type, respectively. 
Of course, not all IRAPs follow this format. For example, Nicholson and Barnes-
Holmes (2012b) employed “Scares me” and “I can approach” as label stimuli categories 1 
and 2, respectively, and pictures of spiders and pleasant nature scenes as target stimuli 
categories 1 and 2, respectively. In cases such as this, we would invert trial-types 2 and 4 to 
organize the vertical axis around scaring versus approaching. D scores greater than zero 
would then represent “Does scare me” or “I cannot approach”, and D scores less than zero 
would represent “Does not scare me” or “I can approach”. 
Finally, not all IRAPs follow the simple format of categories and attributes, such as in 
our self-esteem IRAP example. Indeed, an additional primary reason for employing an IRAP 
over another procedures, such as the IAT, is its ability to assess responses to relatively 
complex relational networks (e.g., involving statements and conditionals: Hussey & Barnes-
Holmes, 2012), rather than the relative strengths of category pairings (Gawronski & De 
Houwer, 2011). As such, the heuristic strategy of conceptualizing labels and target stimuli as 
categories and attributes cannot always be employed. An understanding of how to interpret 
trial-types in relation to one another, and when trial-types should be inverted, is therefore key 
to appropriate analyses of IRAP data. Whichever strategy is employed, researchers should 
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clearly state 1) if trial-types have been inverted, 2) the rationale for this strategy, and 3) the 
resulting interpretation of a plot’s vertical axis. In closing, it is worth emphasizing that 
researchers should work through the stages of interpretation laid out in this article, with 
hypothetical data if necessary, before they start collecting data. Doing so can help refine 
stimulus sets and highlight potential problems early on, thus minimizing time spent hand 
wringing and cursing, having invested considerable time and resources on data collection 
only to find that the resultant IRAP effects are difficult if not impossible to interpret or 
understand 
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